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Market observers at times attribute large stock price changes to analyst recommendation 
changes. For instance, according to the Wall Street Journal’s description, Kenneth Bruce from 
Merrill Lynch issued a recommendation downgrade on Countrywide Financial on August 15, 
2007 questioning the giant mortgage lender's ability to cope with a worsening credit crunch. The 
report sparked a sell-off in Countrywide’s shares, which fell 13% on that day. In another 
example, when Meredith Whitney (CIBC World Markets) downgraded Citigroup on November 1, 
2007, the stock price dropped 6.9%, the CEO quit two days later, and she apparently received 
death threats.
4 Though the finance literature finds that significant average abnormal returns are 
associated with recommendation changes, the typical estimate associated with a recommendation 
change is too small to be considered a significant abnormal return for the stock of a firm when an 
analyst recommendation change is made. Consequently, with the typical recommendation change, 
investors following a firm could not distinguish the impact of the recommendation change from 
noise. However, at times a recommendation change, such as the Bruce call on Countrywide, is 
viewed by observers as having a large identifiable impact on the stock price. In this paper, we try 
to understand better when and why analyst recommendation changes at times appear to have a 
large stock price impact. 
The question we address is different from the question typically answered in the analyst 
literature that tries to assess the impact of analyst recommendation changes. This literature 
focuses on average effects in large samples and generally investigates whether some type of 
analyst recommendation change has a significant average abnormal return. By averaging across a 
large number of announcements, the researcher hopes to eliminate the influence of confounding 
effects on the study and therefore to obtain an estimate of the “pure” recommendation change 
effect. At the same time, however, such an approach is of little use to evaluate claims about the 
                                                 
4 The above examples are from the following articles: “Countrywide's woes multiply” by James R. Hagerty 
and Ruth Simon, The Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2007, and “CIBC analyst got death threats on 
Citigroup”, by Jonathan Stempel, Reuters, November 4, 2007. 
1 ability of analysts to impact stock prices of individual firms significantly. To wit, in our sample, 
the median abnormal return associated with a downgrade is roughly -1%. For the typical firm, a -
1% abnormal return is noise. However, an abnormal return of the magnitude associated with the 
recommendation change of Bruce for Countrywide is a highly significant abnormal return for the 
typical firm.  
The existing literature does not tell us whether analysts frequently make recommendation 
changes whose impact can be identified at the firm level rather than in large-scale samples. We 
identify recommendation changes that are impactful using a simple measure of significance at the 
firm level, namely the standard deviation of market model residuals, and we call such 
recommendation changes influential. To investigate whether recommendation changes are 
influential, it is important to focus on recommendation changes that occur on days without firm-
specific news. Analysts often write reports on days of firm-specific news and recommendation 
changes on such days are more likely to be favorable if the firm has positive news. Though the 
traditional event study method reduces or even eliminates the impact of confounding news on the 
average abnormal return, it does so only when news and the probability of occurrence of the 
event are uncorrelated. In the case of analysts, there is no reason to believe that this condition 
holds. It is therefore important to construct a sample of recommendation changes where the 
impact of confounding firm-specific news is minimized. Eliminating firm-specific news days 
reduces the stock-price reaction to analyst recommendation changes, but the average stock-price 
reaction remains statistically significant. We find that roughly 10% of recommendation changes 
in our sample (that minimizes the impact of firm-specific news) are significant at the firm level 
and hence influential. However, one analyst in four never has an influential recommendation 
change. Conditional on an analyst having an influential recommendation change, one in five of 
the analyst’s recommendation changes are influential.   
Why is it that an analyst at times can make recommendations that are associated with a 
significant firm-level abnormal return? We believe that at times analysts can change how a 
2 corporation is viewed and that such “paradigm shifts” are responsible for the large impact of 
some recommendation changes. This perspective builds on Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007). Hong et 
al. study the implications of learning in an environment in which the true model of the world is a 
multivariate one, but agents update only over the class of simple univariate models. When 
sufficient evidence accumulates against the incumbent simple model, agents switch to another 
simple model, and prices in the underlying stock moves to reflect this paradigm shift. In this 
paper, we investigate whether influential analyst recommendation changes precipitate such 
paradigm shifts.  
Meredith Whitney’s Citigroup downgrade on Nov. 1, 2007 was associated with a drop in 
Citigroup’s stock price of 6.1%. Yet, as a Wall Street Journal recently reported, other analysts in 
the weeks before downgraded the stock with reports that had similar content.
5 Consequently, a 
recommendation change is not influential simply because of its content—other factors must affect 
whether the recommendation change is influential. We use a probit model to investigate the 
factors that make it more likely that a recommendation change will be influential. In support of 
our “paradigm shift” hypothesis, we find that recommendations away from the consensus are 
more likely to be influential. The analysts who are likely to make influential recommendations 
are highly ranked analysts who have a history of being ahead of the crowd. It is harder for an 
analyst to have an influential recommendation when more analysts follow a firm and when the 
firm is larger. However, greater diversity of opinion about a firm makes it more likely that a 
recommendation change will be influential. This result is also consistent with the “paradigm 
shift” view, in that it is harder to change a paradigm when it is well-established.  
When analyst recommendation changes are influential because they are associated with 
paradigm shifts, we should see them lead to much analyst activity and trading in the stock as 
investors adjust their holdings to the new paradigm. We find this is to be the case. Share turnover 
                                                 
5 “When Meredith Whitney calls, should you listen?” by David Weidner, The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 
2009.  
3 is much larger in the three months following an influential analyst change than in the three 
months before. So is stock volatility. Analysts make more forecasts after an influential analyst 
recommendation change than before. Finally, forecast revisions by analysts following such a 
change are much larger than forecast revisions before such a change.  
We are not the first study to examine the differential impact of stock recommendation 
changes. For instance, Stickel (1995) shows that recommendation changes of star analysts have 
more impact and Fang and Yasuda (2008) show that they are more profitable. Irvine (2004) 
provides evidence that the market reacts more strongly to initiations than to other 
recommendations. Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) show that the timing of recommendation 
changes in relation to earnings announcements affects their impact. Asquith, Mikhail, and Au 
(2005) provide evidence that the impact of recommendation changes is affected by the content of 
analyst reports. Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006) examine whether firm characteristics affect 
the impact of earnings forecast revisions but they do not consider analyst characteristics or stock 
recommendations. Chen, Francis, and Schipper (2005) find that the average analyst 
recommendation or earnings forecast produces a price impact that is no different from the average 
stock price movement on non-recommendation days. Most recently, Altinkilic and Hansen (2008) 
report evidence that the average recommendation revision does not produce a statistically 
significant intra-day reaction after removing recommendations that piggyback on firm news such 
as earnings announcements. Both Altinkilic and Hansen and Chen et al. provide evidence to the 
effect that the average recommendation is not influential while our focus is to study which 
recommendations are influential and what makes them influential.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 details the data and sample, Section 3 
describes the average recommendation event abnormal return. Section 4 identifies which 
recommendations are influential and their characteristics and consequences, Section 5 
investigates predictive variables for influential recommendations, Section 6 considers alternative 
definitions of influential, and Section 7 concludes.  
4 2.  Data and Sample 
2.1.  Recommendations data 
The stock recommendations sample is from Thomson Financial’s Institutional Brokers 
Estimate (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail File, which contains stock recommendation ratings issued by 
individual analysts from 1993-2006. I/B/E/S reports ratings ranging from 1 (strong buy) to 5 
(sell). To make the ratings more intuitive, we reverse the ratings (5 for strong buy and 1 for sell, 
etc.) so that higher ratings correspond to more favorable recommendations. The focus is on 
recommendation revisions and not levels since prior research confirms that recommendation 
changes are more informative than mere levels (e.g., Boni and Womack (2006) and Jegadeesh 
and Kim (2006)). The recommendation change RECCHG is computed as the current rating minus 
the prior rating by the same analyst. By construction,  ] 4 , 4 [− ∈ RECCHG . We exclude the 
recommendation if there is no outstanding prior rating from the same analyst (i.e., analyst 
initiations are excluded). A rating is always assumed to be outstanding if it is less than one year 
old and never if it is more than two years old; if the rating is between one and two years old, it is 
treated as outstanding only if there is an analyst forecast from the analyst in the one year window 
prior to the recommendation date (matching to the I/B/E/S Detail Earnings Forecast File).
6  
We also remove analysts coded as anonymous by I/B/E/S since it is not possible to track their 
recommendation revisions. Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2008) report that matched records 
in the I/B/E/S recommendations data were altered between downloads from 2000 to 2007. They 
also document that Thomson Financial, in response to their paper, has recently reinstated the 
                                                 
6 The results are robust to using a stale criterion of one year. Most studies consider recommendations 
stale if they are more than one year old. This criterion is too stringent because in I/B/E/S, the average time 
it takes for an analyst to revise a recommendation is 274 days and 25% of the time it takes more than 360 
days (Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) provide similar statistics). By refining the stale 
recommendation criterion, we avoid excluding outstanding recommendations that would be considered 
stale by other studies. The fact that the analyst issued a recent earnings forecast for the firm is consistent 
with continuing active coverage.  
5 missing analyst names in the recommendation history file as of February 12, 2007. The dataset 
we use is dated March 15, 2007 and likely reflects these recent corrections by Thomson. 
A portion of the sample period is affected by the introduction of Rule 2711 by the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). Part of the NASD 2711 rule required brokerages to 
report the distribution of stock ratings across its coverage universe. This rule was approved on 
May 8, 2002 with an implementation period ending September 9, 2002. Many brokers reissued 
stock recommendations in the implementation period. As a result, 2002 contains the most number 
of recommendations in I/B/E/S compared to any other sample year (see Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols, and Trueman (2006)). To account for this structural break, we remove 
recommendation changes where the current recommendation is issued between May 8, 2002 and 
September 9, 2002 (inclusive) and the prior recommendation was issued before May 8, 2002. 
Such recommendation changes are likely to be motivated by adherence to the NASD 2711 rule 
rather than by stock selection. 
Since we cannot determine the exact time of day of recommendation changes, we adopt a 
three-day event window to make sure that we incorporate the daily return reflecting the 
recommendation change. To compute the three-day (i.e., three trading days) cumulative buy-and-
hold abnormal return (CAR) for a recommendation change i, we define   
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Rit is the raw return of the stock on day t and   is the return on a benchmark portfolio with 
the same size, book-to-market (B/M), and momentum characteristics as the stock (Daniel, 
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), thereafter DGTW).
DGTW
it R
7 Day 0 is the I/B/E/S reported 
recommendation date or the next trading day if the recommendation date is a non-trading day (for 
example, a Saturday). The DGTW portfolios are computed as follows. Every July, firms are first 
 
7 The results are similar when we use the sum of abnormal returns rather the buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns.  
6 sorted into quintiles based on their market cap on June 30 of each year using break-points 
determined from NYSE stocks. Second, firms are then sorted within each size quintile into 
quintiles based on their B/M ratios. B/M ratios are computed as in Fama and French (2006). 
Third, firms within each size-B/M group are sorted into momentum quintiles every month based 
on the buy-and-hold return over the prior 12 months skipping the most recent month. Therefore 
the size and B/M rankings are updated every 12 months while the momentum rankings are 
updated monthly. Finally, the stocks within each characteristic portfolio are equally-weighted at 
the beginning of each month and the buy-and-hold average daily returns are computed.  
2.2.  Importance of removing recommendations made in response to firm news 
If a stock recommendation has an immediate impact on a firm’s stock price,  it does so 
because it reveals information about the firm.
 In determining whether the analyst produced any 
material information, one should be careful to remove recommendations that merely repeat the 
information contained in firm-specific news releases. As already discussed, Altinkilic and Hansen 
(2008) go so far as to argue that once the impact of other news is removed, analyst 
recommendation changes do not have an impact. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) and Loh 
(2007) report that 12-13% of stock recommendations occur in the three days around quarterly 
earnings announcements. Since there are 252 trading days in a year, one would expect only 4.8% 
of all recommendations to be issued around earnings announcements if the likelihood of a 
recommendation is uniformly distributed throughout the year. Therefore, not removing such 
earnings announcements recommendations falsely gives credit to the analyst recommendation for 
producing the earnings announcement price impact (see also, Frankel et al. (2006)). To apply this 
screen, we obtain quarterly earnings announcement dates from I/B/E/S.  
Another type of firm-specific news release is earnings guidance issued by firms. Chen et al. 
(2005) suggest that such days should also be taken out when determining the price impact of 
stock recommendations. We obtain earnings guidance dates from the First Call Guidelines 
database. Finally, Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2007) contend that clustering in recommendation 
7 changes usually occur because of firm-specific news. Therefore we also identify days on which 
multiple analysts issue recommendations for the firm as potential firm-specific news events.  
3.  The average CAR of recommendations changes 
In this section, we estimate the average CAR of recommendation changes to provide a 
benchmark for our later analysis and to show how minimizing the impact of firm-specific news 
affects the estimate of the average CAR of recommendation changes.   
3.1.  Descriptive statistics of recommendation changes  
Our main sample contains 196,854 recommendation changes. Panel A of Table 1 shows the 
transition probabilities of recommendation changes. We see that recommendation levels are 
predominantly optimistic with sell and underperform ratings making up only a small percentage 
of all recommendations. Looking at rating changes where the prior rating was a hold (third 
column), we see that a hold is more likely to migrate to a buy recommendation (36% of the time). 
For rating changes where the prior rating was a buy, a downgrade to hold is very likely (49% of 
the time). Figure 1 plots the transition probabilities in Panel A of Table 1.  
Next, Panel B summarizes the number of recommendations according to the sign and 
magnitude of the rating change. The two rating change groups that have the largest number of 
recommendations are one-point upgrades (+1) and one-point downgrades (–1). The +1 group 
contains 47,006 recommendations (23.9% of the sample) and the –1 group contains the 57,290 
recommendations. Reiterations (rating change of 0) make up 21.7% of all recommendation 
changes. Looking at the diagonal cells in Panel A of Table 1, we observe that hold 
recommendations are the most likely to be reiterated, followed by buys and strong buys.   
3.2.  Histogram of recommendation CAR 
Figure 2 plots the histogram of three-day CARs of recommendation changes for one- and 
two-point magnitude rating changes. The first two charts show the distribution of CARs for one- 
and two point upgrades. The mean CAR for a one-point upgrade is 2.687% and that for a two-
8 point upgrade is 2.783%. The medians are much lower at 1.530% and 1.694% respectively. This 
reveals that the magnitude of the mean CARs are strongly influenced by outliers. Another piece 
of suggestive evidence that only a minority of recommendations are influential is that a sizable 
number of CARs fall into the zero bin. Note that each interval in the histogram is one percent so 
that the zero bin represents CARs between -0.5% and 0.5%. The distributions also do not appear 
to resemble a normal distribution given that there are more right tail observations than there are 
left tail observations for positive recommendation changes, implying positive skewness in the 
distribution. The opposite result holds for negative recommendation changes. 
The last two charts in Figure 2 show the one- and two-point rating changes for downgrades. 
The charts here tell a similar story. The median CARs are much more attenuated compared to the 
mean CAR and there is evidence that tail observations have a large influence so that the typical 
downgrade CAR may be very different from the mean downgrade CAR.  
3.3.  Impact of firm news events and influential observations on mean CAR 
The next analysis reports how the average CAR of recommendation changes is affected when 
recommendations issued together with firm news events are removed and when outlier 
recommendations are removed.  
The nine panels of Table 2 show the distribution statistics of recommendation change 
categories by subsamples sequentially from -4 to +4. We begin by examining downgrades and 
focus on the fourth panel, the rating change of -1, which has the largest number of observations 
among all downgrade categories.  Sample 1 is the full set of -1 downgrades.  The average CAR is 
-3.786% with a trivially small associated p-value (reported as 0.000) based on standard errors 
clustered by calendar day. Although the average CAR is large, we see evidence that it could be 
driven by outliers because the median CAR is only -1.775% (p-value of 0.000 from a signed test). 
As we saw in the histogram earlier, the distribution of CARs does not appear normal and this is 
now confirmed with the negative skewness (many left tail outlier observations) and the large 
positive kurtosis (tails fatter than predicted by a normal distribution). We also report the 
9 Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-statistic as a test of normality with the p-value in parentheses below the 
D-statistics. The null hypothesis is normality and we see that normality is soundly rejected.
8  
Further evidence that the mean gives a misleading view of the typical CAR can be seen in the 
mode of the various groups. Using 50 basis points (bps) intervals, we find that the modal CAR is 
-1%, which means that the interval containing the most values of CAR is [-1.25%, -0.75%]. 
Another interesting statistic (third column) is the percentage of positive-signed CARs. A positive 
CAR in this case shows that a -1 rating change was associated with a stock price movement in the 
opposite direction from the rating change. 33.48% of -1 rating changes actually had CARs with 
the wrong sign.  
Next, we examine the impact of removing recommendations that are contaminated by firm 
news releases. First, we remove observations that fall in the three-day window around quarterly 
earnings announcements dates reported by I/B/E/S.
9 The impact of this removal is to reduce the 
average CAR to -3.246% (see sample 2). Next, we also remove from sample 2 the 
recommendations that fall in the three day window around management earnings guidance days 
and find that the average CAR drops dramatically to -2.030%. Finally, we remove days with 
multiple recommendations since these days could correspond to firm news releases that led 
multiple analysts to revise their ratings. The average CAR now becomes -1.623%. Although the 
average CAR is still statistically significant in sample 4, we see that moving from sample 1 to 
sample 4, the economic magnitude of the average CAR drops by more than half from -3.786% to 
-1.623%. The median CAR also falls from -1.775% to -1.074%. These results stress that a large 
fraction of the average recommendation CAR should be attributed to contemporaneous firm news 
                                                 
8 It could be that stock returns are not normal so that the recommendation CARs are also not normal. 
However, all the results in   remain even when log abnormal returns (ln of 1+Eq. 1) are used in place 
of regular CARs.  
Table 2
9 Quarterly earnings announcement dates can be obtained from either I/B/E/S or Compustat. DellaVigna 
and Pollet (2009) show that after 1994, earnings announcement dates provided both databases are equally 
accurate.  
10 releases rather than to the recommendation itself and this is consistent with the findings in Chen 
et al. (2005) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2008).  
Next, we consider the impact of removing outlier observations from this reduced sample of 
38,515 recommendations. We consider two ways of removing outliers in sample 4. We note that 
sample 4 still has fat tails and negative skewness. The first method is to trim 5% from both tails 
of the sample distribution and we find that the average CAR reduces to -1.420% (see sample 5 
row). The skewness and kurtosis drops significantly as a result of this filter.  The second method 
is to identify outliers in an objective manner by using least trimmed squares (LTS) method (see 
for example, Knez and Ready (1997)). Specifically, we estimated a regression using LTS with the 
recommendation change CAR against a constant. This regression allows us to identify the 
observations that have the most influence on the coefficient estimate. We then compute the mean 
CAR by excluding the LTS-identified outliers and report the descriptive statistics from this new 
sample 6.  The average CAR is now -1.194% and the median is -0.977%. Although the 
magnitudes are reduced dramatically from sample 1, we note that they are still statistically 
different from zero.  
Other panels in Table 2 show similar patterns. First, the median CAR is roughly half of the 
mean CAR in absolute value, showing that outlier recommendations have a large influence on the 
mean. Second, removing all firm-news contaminated recommendations shaves off a sizable 
proportion (sometimes more than half) of the absolute value mean and median CARs, evidence 
that many recommendations do not add additional value but merely repeat information contained 
in firm news releases. Third, removing outliers from both tails further reduces the magnitude of 
the typical recommendation absolute value average CAR. Altogether, the results in this table 
show that the distributions of CARs are not normal. The CAR distributions are usually skewed 
and have fat tails, and outliers have an important impact on the mean CAR. Also, controlling for 
firm-specific news sharply reduces the average impact that a stock recommendation has on a 
firm’s stock price.  
11  Table 3 shows the sensitivity of the magnitude and statistical significance of the mean 
recommendation CAR when part of the influential tail is removed. The first row of the table 
shows the size and significance (with one, two, and three asterisks representing 10%, 5% and 1% 
statistical significance respectively) of the mean CAR when confounding firm-news events are 
removed. This is essentially the sample 4 from the panels of Table 2. The second row of the table 
“1%” reports the average CAR when 1% of the influential tail is removed. This means removing 
1% of the left tail of a downgrade category or removing the 1% of the right tail of an upgrade 
category. When the average CAR becomes statistically insignificant after the removal of x% of 
the influential tail, the rows below are intentionally left blank. For example, rating changes of -4 
have an average CAR of -1.803% but once we remove 3% of the left tail, the average CAR 
becomes a statistically insignificant -0.385%. Therefore in this rating change group, we label 3% 
of the observations of the left tail as influential and the other observations as non-influential.    
The rest of Table 3 shows us that all four downgrade categories, removing up to 10% of the 
left tail removes the statistical significance of the mean CAR. The rating change group of -4 only 
requires removal of 3% of the tail and the rating change group of -3 already has an insignificant 
mean CAR without the removal of any tail observations. For the positive rating change groups, 
more of the positive tail needs to be removed before the mean CARs become insignificant. For 
the +2 group for example, 20% of the right tail needed to be removed before the mean CAR 
became insignificant. This table illustrates the importance of influential observations in the 
average price reaction to recommendations.  
4.  Influential versus non-influential recommendation changes 
4.1.  Methods for classifying recommendation changes 
In this section, we identify recommendation changes that are influential and compare them 
with non-influential recommendation changes. We report results for two definitions of influential. 
We consider only rating changes in our analysis and exclude reiterations.  
12 The first method classifies a recommendation change as an influential recommendation 
change if the CAR is greater than 1.96 times the standard deviation of the firm’s prior three-
month idiosyncratic return.  We focus most of our discussion on this method and use the second 
method as a robustness test. This method is intuitive: it treats as influential recommendation 
changes accompanied by an abnormal return that is significant using the market model. 
Specifically, a recommendation change is influential if  ε σ × × > 3 96 . 1 CAR , where  ε σ  is the 
standard deviation of firm residual returns in the prior three months ([-63,-2] days) from the 
recommendation change. We multiply by  3  since the CAR is a three-day CAR while the  ε σ  is 
the standard deviation of residuals from a daily time-series regression of firm returns against 
market returns and the two Fama-French factors. This measure roughly captures recommendation 
changes that observers would judge to be influential, namely those recommendation changes that 
are associated with noticeable abnormal returns that may be attributable to the recommendation 
changes.  
The second approach classifies a recommendation change as influential when its normalized 
CAR is more than 1.96 standard deviations better than the mean prior 12-month normalized CAR 
of the similar rating change category across all firms. A normalized CAR is simply the CAR 
scaled by the firm’s prior idiosyncratic volatility. Recommendation changes are considered 
influential using this second approach based on historical recommendation change CARs rather 
than merely based on the prior idiosyncratic volatility of the firm. This second method identifies 
as influential recommendation changes that have an unusual impact relative to other similar 
recommendation changes. This definition may also capture what observers mean when they 
notice specific recommendation changes in that it selects recommendation changes with possibly 
large effects relative to typical recommendation changes. However, the stock-price reaction for 
these recommendation changes need not be significant at the firm level. We also use other 
definitions of influential (see Section 6) but our main tests focus on these two methods.  
13 The first row of Table 4 reports the number of recommendations that are categorized into 
each dimension of success. We see that 10.0% (3.2%) of all recommendation changes are defined 
as influential using the first (second) definition.  
4.2.  Analyst and firm characteristics of influential recommendations changes  
We now compare the average characteristics of influential recommendation changes versus 
non-influential changes for each rating change category. We examine the following analyst-
related characteristics: 
1)  Forecast accuracy: Loh and Mian (2006) show that analysts who possess more accurate 
earnings forecasts issue more profitable contemporaneous stock recommendations. It is 
possible that such analysts have recommendations that also have a larger market impact 
since their recommendation changes are accompanied by more accurate concurrent 
earnings forecasts.  We compute the forecast accuracy quintile of an analyst by sorting 
analysts within a firm year into quintiles using the last unrevised forecast of the analyst 
on the I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File. Only firms with at least five analysts are included. The 
forecast accuracy rank (1 being the most accurate) is assigned to the analyst for the 
recommendations that the analyst issues during the 12 month window that overlaps three 
months into the next fiscal year (following Loh and Mian). Overlapping the 12 month 
period into the next fiscal year allows the accuracy rank to be applied during the months 
when fiscal year’s actual earnings are announced. Note that this accuracy rank is a perfect 
foresight rank and is not known at the time of the recommendation since actual earnings 
have not yet been announced.  
2)  Direction of recommendation relative to the consensus: Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) 
formulate a test for herding and contend that if analysts herd, recommendations that go 
toward the consensus would have a smaller price impact than those that go away from the 
consensus. Following their paper, we define recommendations that go away from the 
consensus as those where the absolute deviation of the new recommendation from the 
14 consensus is larger than the absolute deviation of the prior recommendation from the 
consensus. The consensus recommendation is defined as the mean recommendation level 
that includes the most recent non-stale recommendation issued by all analysts covering 
the firm (see Section 2.1 for the definition of stale).  
3)  Star analyst: This is an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst is ranked as an 
All-American (first, second, third, or runner-up teams) in the annual polls in the 
Institutional Investor Magazine. Analyst names in I/B/E/S are matched to Institutional 
Investor polls (published in the October issue) and an analyst maintains the star status for 
12 months beginning the November after the polls. The star analyst indicator variable 
proxies for the reputation of the analyst and the market’s attentiveness to the stock 
recommendation (the market could pay more attention to calls from star analysts).  
4)  Analyst experience: Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) show that analysts improve their 
earnings forecast accuracy with experience. Hence, it is possible that experience could be 
related to the market impact of stock recommendation changes. Analyst experience is 
measured as the number of quarters since the analyst issued the first earnings forecasts or 
stock recommendation on I/B/E/S. If an analyst appears in both the earnings forecasts and 
the recommendation file, the earlier of the two dates is used. Two measures of experience 
are computed. The first is the analyst’s overall experience, which is the number of 
quarters that he appeared on I/B/E/S. The second is the relative experience which is the 
number of quarters the analyst has covered that specific firm minus the average 
experience for all analysts covering the firm.  
5)  Concurrent earnings forecast: Michaely and Womack (2006) report that stock 
recommendations accompanied by forecast revisions are more profitable and have larger 
price reactions. Therefore, we include a concurrent earnings forecast indicator variable 
indicating whether the same analyst issued any type of earnings forecast in the three-day 
window around the recommendation change.  
15 We compute the average of these analyst-specific variables for the different rating change 
groups. Table 4 reports the averages for observations where these variables can be computed. The 
first subsample analysis separates recommendation changes into influential and non-influential 
using the ratio of the CAR to the firm’s prior idiosyncratic volatility. The average analyst forecast 
accuracy quintile of influential recommendation changes is 2.802 versus 2.769 for non-influential 
recommendations. The difference is statistically significant, but its economic importance seems 
limited. 58.2% of influential recommendation changes move away from the consensus while only 
52.5% of non-influential recommendation changes move away from the consensus—the 
difference is significant. Also, a larger proportion of influential recommendation changes are 
issued by star analysts and analysts with higher overall experience and relative firm-specific 
experience. A larger proportion of influential recommendation changes have concurrent earnings 
forecasts issued together with the recommendation change. These differences are as predicted 
from the prior literature. Using the second definition of influential (based on prior distribution of 
recommendation CARs) yields similar patterns of differences. Influential recommendation 
changes are associated with higher analyst forecast accuracy, are issued away from the consensus, 
from star analysts, and have concurrently issued earnings forecasts. The benefit of having more 
relative firm-experience appears mixed across the two definitions of influential.  
Next, in Panel B, we also consider firm characteristics because firm characteristics could 
create conditions that make it more likely that analysts could make significant recommendation 
changes. For example, analysts may add more value when the value of the firm depends more on 
growth options which are harder to value than assets-in-place. We examine the following firm 
characteristics.  
1)  Book-to-market ratio (B/M ratio) computed as in Fama and French (2006). 
2)  Size of the firm (lagged month market cap). 
3)  Institutional ownership (percent of shares owned by institutions as reported in Thomson 
13f in the most recent quarter end).  
16 4)  Dispersion is the standard deviation of the I/B/E/S Summary unadjusted file reported 
mean FY1 forecast divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast (following Diether, 
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)).  
5)  # of forecasts is the number of forecasts (all horizons) issued by all analysts for the firm 
in the last three months ([-63,-2]). 
6)  Turnover is based on the last three-month average daily percentage of shares traded 
divided by total shares outstanding.  
7)  Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals from a time-series 
regression of past three-months’ daily returns against the Fama-French three factors. 
8)  Total volatility is the standard deviation of prior three-month daily returns.  
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 4. We first look at the first definition of 
influential. Influential recommendation changes tend to be issued on firms that are smaller, have 
higher institutional ownership, lower total and idiosyncratic volatility, lower turnover, and lower 
number of prior earnings forecasts. The second definition of influential yields similar results. 
These results are consistent with the paradigm change view of influential analyst recommendation 
changes. Analysts can more easily affect investors’ beliefs about a firm when they are speaking in 
a smaller crowd. However, institutional investors are the main consumers of analyst reports, so 
that analysts are more likely to have a significant impact if a firm has more institutional 
ownership.   
4.3.  The effect of influential recommendation changes 
Next, we consider changes in the firm environment. With the paradigm shift view, we would 
expect influential recommendation changes to be associated with important changes in the firm’s 
expected performance and trading. Hong et al. (2007) propose that a paradigm shift is followed 
by increases in volatility. It is also possible that analyst activity and trading activity increase 
following a paradigm shift. We investigate changes in some firm-specific variables around the 
rating change event. The variables considered are:  
17 1)  The leader-follower ratio (LFR) is computed following Cooper, Day, and Lewis 
(2001) so as to gauge the extent to which the influential recommendation change leads other 
analysts to change their recommendations. The gaps between the current recommendation 
and the previous two recommendations from other brokers are computed and summed. The 
same is done for the next two recommendations. The leader-follower ratio is the gap sum of 
the prior two recommendations divided by the gap sum of the next two recommendations. 
Ratios larger than one show that other brokers issue new ratings quickly in response to the 
current analyst’s recommendation. The schematic below illustrates the LFR of 
recommendation i: LFRi=(80+40)/(20+10)=4, which is greater than one and hence the analyst 
associated with recommendation i is a leader analyst.    
Recommendation i  
10 days  
20 days   40 days  
80 days  
 
2)  Change in volatility from the prior three months ([-63,-2] days) to the next three 
months ([2,63] days). The same horizon is used for the variables below.  
3)  Change in idiosyncratic volatility. 
4)  Change in analyst forecast dispersion. 
5)  Change in average daily turnover. 
6)  Change in number of earnings forecasts issued.  
7)  Change in the magnitude of monthly consensus FY1 and FY2 forecast revisions 
scaled by price, and long-term growth percentage forecasts.   
18 Panel C of Table 4 reports the change in the above characteristics for the influential versus 
non-influential recommendation changes. The evidence strongly suggests a more significant 
change in the firm’s information environment after influential recommendation changes. The 
LFR of influential recommendation changes is larger than the LFR of non-influential 
recommendation changes. Changes in idiosyncratic and total volatility are also larger for 
influential recommendation changes compared to non-influential recommendation changes. 
However, there is no difference in the change in dispersion. Finally, analyst and trading activity 
increase more following influential recommendation changes than non-influential 
recommendation changes. 
An influential recommendation change would presumably change the way that investors view 
the future cash flows of the firm and this could show up in analyst forecast revisions. The change 
in the absolute value of FY1 and FY2 forecast revisions is significantly positive for influential 
recommendation changes. For example, the change in magnitude of FY2 forecast revisions for 
influential recommendation changes is 1.088% of price but only 0.075% of price for non-
influential recommendation changes (first definition of influential). The difference of 1.012% is 
statistically significant. In contrast, there is little corroborating evidence for the magnitude of 
change in LTG forecasts. 
4.4.  Do influential recommendation changes come from only a subset of analysts? 
Next, we investigate whether influential recommendation changes come only from a subset of 
analysts. Figure 3 plots the histogram of the proportion of an analyst’s recommendation changes 
that are influential. We limit this analysis to analysts who made at least five recommendation 
changes in the sample period. If all analysts were equally capable of making influential 
recommendation changes, we would expect the distribution to peak around the average 
proportion of influential recommendation changes in the entire sample. The figure shows 
otherwise. The first chart uses the first definition of influential. Although the unconditional 
proportion of influential recommendation changes is 10% in the sample, about 25% of all 
19 analysts never issue a single influential recommendation change in their lifetimes. For the other 
definition of influential (based on past recommendation CARs), about 56% of analysts never 
issue an influential recommendation change. This skewed distribution indicates that only some 
analysts are influential and that there is a sizable proportion of analysts whose recommendation 
changes never have a noticeable stock-price impact.  
Table 5 compares the characteristics of analysts who issue at least one influential 
recommendation change in the sample versus the other analysts. One would expect the “Ever 
influential” group to dominate the “Never influential” group in terms of skill, experience, star 
status, etc. Indeed this is the case. Analysts who issue at least one influential recommendation 
change in the sample have better average analyst earnings forecast accuracy ranks. They are also 
more likely to issue recommendations away from the consensus, have once been a star analyst, 
and have greater absolute and relative experience compared to “Never influential” analysts.    
5.  Predicting which recommendation changes will be influential  
Section 4 provides evidence that influential recommendation changes are associated with 
specific analyst and firm attributes. Since many of these attributes are correlated, we use in this 
section a probit regression to assess the impact of these attributes on the likelihood that a 
recommendation will be influential. To make our approach predictive, we require the attributes to 
be known at the time of the recommendation change. All the variables used in the previous 
section are already based on past information except for forecast accuracy and the LFR. To make 
these two variables rely on past information, the forecast accuracy quintile is now the average 
quintile rank of the analyst for all the firms that he covers in the prior fiscal year and the LFR is 
now the average of the analyst’s prior LFRs for the past 12 months. The definitions of the other 
attributes are the same as before. The probit regression is estimated for observations where all the 
required variables are available and the standard errors are clustered by analyst. We also add 
controls for the level of the recommendation, the absolute value of the recommendation change, 
20 an upgrade indicator variable, and indicator variables for the sample period after Reg FD (equals 
one from September 2000 onwards) and after the Global Analyst Settlement (equals one in 2003 
and onwards).
10  
The dependent variable of the probit regression is equal to one if the recommendation change 
is influential. We report both coefficient estimates and marginal effects. 
11 The results confirm the 
conclusions reached in the previous section. A recommendation change is more likely to be 
influential if it represents a move away from the consensus, it is from a star analyst,
12 from an 
analyst with more relative experience, has a contemporaneous earnings forecast, and from an 
analyst with high prior LFR. Firms that are more likely to receive impactful recommendation 
changes are growth firms, small firms, high institutional ownership firms, high prior turnover 
firms, less volatile firms, and low prior number of earnings forecasts firms.  
The control variables also include indicator variables for Reg FD and the analyst settlement. 
After Reg FD was passed in August 2000, analysts were no longer allowed to get access to 
private information from firm executives. If such private information is one main source of 
influential recommendation changes, we would expect influential recommendation changes to 
abate after the passage of the law. For example, Gintschel and Markov (2004) show evidence that 
selective disclosure was curtailed after Reg FD and the absolute price impact of analyst output 
was reduced. We find, however, that the Reg FD dummy is significantly positive, implying that 
influential recommendation changes are even more likely after Reg FD.  
                                                 
10 In order to allow structural breaks to be identified, we compute the second definition of influential in 
a different manner compared to the earlier table. For the probit regression only, we compare the 
recommendation CAR against the distribution of similar rating change category CARs for the entire sample 
period instead of just using the prior 12 months. 
11  The marginal effect of a continuous variable x is the partial derivative with respect to x of the 
prediction function, evaluated at the mean value of y. If the independent variable is ln(x), the partial 
derivative will be δy/δln(x), which is the partial derivative of y with respect to a 1% change in x. If x is a 
dummy variable, the marginal effect is the discrete change in y as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. 
12 The star analyst variable is a four point variable which we utilize their actual all American rank with 
higher numbers signifying a superior rank. We assign star=1 for runner-up ranks, up to star=4 for first place 
ranks.  
21 For the settlement, Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) find that after the settlement 
(their sample goes up to 2004 only), the overall informativeness of recommendations was 
reduced. Boni (2006) also finds similar evidence. Although, the overall informativeness of 
recommendations decreased, Kadan et al. also find that the falling number of optimistic 
recommendations could have caused optimistic recommendations to be become more 
informative. Our probit estimations find some evidence that a recommendation change is more 
likely to be influential after the settlement, especially for the first definition of influential. When 
we add an interaction variable upgrade×settlement to the estimations (unreported), we find that 
this interaction term is significant for the second definition of influential)—meaning that 
influential upgrades were more likely after the settlement. Altogether, our results suggest that 
although the overall impact of Reg FD and the settlement could have reduced the mean price 
impact of recommendations, the probability that a recommendation change is influential actually 
increased.  
6.  Alternative definitions of influential 
We also use other methods of classifying recommendation changes as influential with 
generally similar results. One method is the one illustrated in Table 3 where influential tail 
observations are identified as those observations which, when removed, render the average 
recommendation change CAR insignificant. This method has a look-ahead bias since it relies on 
all future CARs in the entire sample period. Another method we also consider is whether 
recommendations returns beat twice the average CAR of same category rating changes that 
occurred in the last 12 months. We find that about 29.5% of them do. 
Finally, we simply rely on the sign of the recommendation change CAR. One can view this as 
the lowest hurdle for the definition of influential since it only requires that the CAR has a correct 
sign. A correct recommendation change is one associated with a CAR that has the same sign as 
the direction of the recommendation change. Considering the sign of the recommendation change 
22 CAR improves upon the methodology in some studies that evaluate recommendation changes 
based on only the absolute unsigned reaction magnitudes (example, Chen et al. (2005) and 
Frankel et al. (2006)).   
7.  Conclusion  
Recommendation changes are sometimes associated with extremely large abnormal returns 
and these changes are typically the ones that the press focuses on. Such changes are associated 
with stock-price reactions that are quite different from the stock-price reaction of the typical 
recommendation change. The existing literature on analyst recommendation changes focuses on 
the average stock-price reaction. We show that the average stock-price reaction is small enough 
when proper care is taken to account for confounding news that for an individual stock it would 
not be identifiable with a firm-level event study. We call analyst recommendation changes with 
an identifiable impact at the firm level influential recommendation changes.  
It is not surprising that some analyst recommendation changes will have a large impact. We 
argue that some analyst recommendation changes lead to a paradigm shift in how a firm is 
assessed by investors. We investigate the frequency of such recommendation changes, when a 
recommendation change is likely to be influential, and how the firm’s information environment 
changes around influential recommendation changes. Using as our criterion for influential 
recommendation changes significance of the abnormal return in a firm-level event study, we find 
that roughly 10% of the recommendation changes in I/B/E/S after eliminating changes associated 
with confounding information are influential. Strikingly, a quarter of the analysts never have an 
influential recommendation change. We find that influential recommendations are more likely to 
be from analysts with larger leader-follower ratios, large brokers, away-from-consensus revisions, 
issued contemporaneously with earnings forecasts, and more experienced analysts. Further, 
growth firms, small firms, high institutional ownership firms, high prior turnover firms, and low 
prior number of earnings forecasts firms are more likely to be associated with influential 
23 24 
recommendations. We also find evidence consistent with a paradigm shift for firms that 
experience influential recommendation changes: we find that if a firm has an influential 
recommendation change, its stock’s turnover increases, its volatility increases, and analysts make 
more and bigger forecast changes. Overall our evidence is supportive of the view that influential 
analyst forecasts arise when analysts succeed in creating a paradigm shift, i.e., a significant 
change in how investors perceive a firm. However, analysts are like writers. Sometimes they have 
best-sellers, but the odds of writing a best-seller are low and whether a book is a best-seller 
depends on many factors that are not under the control of the writer.  References 
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 Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of recommendation changes 
The sample of recommendation (rec) changes are from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File 1993 to 2006. Each rec 
change (or rating change) is an analyst’s current rating minus his prior rating. Analyst initiations are 
excluded. Ratings are coded as 1 (sell) to strong buy (5), and rating changes lie between -4 and 4. Firms 
with less than 3 analysts making up the consensus are excluded. Panel reports the transition probabilities of 
rec changes. For example in column 1, when the prior rec is a sell, it has a 4.6% probability of transiting an 
underperform. Panel B reports the frequencies of each rec change type.   
 
Panel A: Transition probabilities of recommendation changes
Current Rec 12345
Prior Rec Sell Underperform Hold Buy Strong  Buy
1 (Sell) 336 193 3,026 305 333 4,193
8.0% 4.6% 72.2% 7.3% 7.9% 100%
2 (Underperform) 287 1,519 4,891 863 213 7,773
3.7% 19.5% 62.9% 11.1% 2.7% 100%
3 (Hold) 3,243 5,834 17,246 24,067 16,508 66,898
4.8% 8.7% 25.8% 36.0% 24.7% 100%
4 (Buy) 431 1,223 31,781 14,043 17,855 65,333
0.7% 1.9% 48.6% 21.5% 27.3% 100%
5 (Strong Buy) 572 427 22,609 19,388 9,661 52,657
1.1% 0.8% 42.9% 36.8% 18.3% 100%
Total 4,869 9,196 79,553 58,666 44,570 196,854
Total
 
 
Panel B: Recommendation change categories
Rec Change Frequency Percentage
–4 572                 0.3%
–3 858                 0.4%
–2 27,075            13.8%
–1 57,290            29.1%
0 42,805            21.7%
+1 47,006            23.9%
+2 20,397            10.4%
+3 518                 0.3%
+4 333                 0.2%
Total 196,854          100% 
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Table 2 
The impact of various filters on recommendation event percentage CAR  
The sample of recommendation (rec) changes are from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File. Each rec-change is an analyst’s current rating minus his prior rating. Analyst 
initiations are excluded. Ratings are coded as 1 (sell) to strong buy (5), and rating changes lie between -4 and 4. Firms with less than 3 analysts making up the 
consensus are excluded. Each panel reports summary statistics for the three-day buy-and-hold event CAR (in percent) of a rec-change group. P-values based on 
standard errors clustered by calendar day are reported in parentheses below the mean. Daily abnormal return is the raw return less the return on a size-B/M-
momentum matched portfolio with CAR observations where the lagged price on day 0 is <$1 excluded. The mode column reports the midpoint of the 50bps 
interval modal group. P-value of the median is computed from a signed test. Kurt is excess kurtosis so that a normal distribution would have Kurt=0. KS is the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic testing for the normality of the sample distribution where *, **, and *** represent that the null of normality is rejected at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. No earnings annc refer to excluding rec-changes that occur in the three-day window around the firm’s I/B/E/S reported 
quarterly earnings announcement dates. No mgt forecast refer to excluding rec-changes that occur in the three-day window around the firm’s management 
earnings guidance dates provided by First Call Guidelines. No multiple rec days refer to excluding days where more than one analyst issues recs on the firm. 
Least trimmed squares outliers (LTS) are identified by estimating a LTS regression of CAR against a constant.   
100% 99% 75% Median 25% 1% 0%
-4.716*** -0.5 0.332 -1.101 7.708 0.214*** 92.841 38.825 1.123 -1.844*** -6.673 -70.277 -79.662 572       
(0.000) (0.000)
-4.336*** -0.5 0.342 -1.229 8.348 0.233*** 92.841 38.825 1.157 -1.525*** -5.634 -70.277 -79.662 491       
(0.000) (0.000)
-2.643*** -0.5 0.366 -1.178 12.703 0.229*** 92.841 38.825 1.441 -1.181*** -4.644 -70.277 -79.662 451       
(0.001) (0.000)
-1.747*** -0.5 0.371 -2.285 17.953 0.197*** 51.830 18.981 1.247 -0.991*** -3.760 -46.832 -79.662 377       
(0.001) (0.000)
-1.157*** -0.5 0.358 0.096 0.684 0.066*** 10.736 9.694 0.923 -0.991*** -3.327 -11.128 -11.570 341       
(0.000) (0.000)
-1.253*** -0.5 0.355 -0.023 0.745 0.067*** 10.736 9.694 0.898 -1.016*** -3.429 -11.570 -12.885 344       
(0.000) (0.000)
-3.312*** -1 0.382 -0.840 5.993 0.182*** 71.759 32.750 1.734 -1.231*** -5.773 -50.156 -73.070 858       
(0.000) (0.000)
-2.463*** -1 0.394 -0.840 7.482 0.191*** 71.759 34.337 1.912 -1.047*** -5.011 -50.156 -73.070 748       
(0.000) (0.000)
-1.322*** -1 0.414 -0.783 10.530 0.187*** 71.759 34.337 2.086 -0.802*** -4.104 -49.102 -73.070 701       
(0.006) (0.000)
-0.577 -1 0.415 0.056 11.002 0.169*** 61.748 29.952 2.133 -0.718*** -3.672 -33.195 -63.861 629       
(0.146) (0.000)
-0.646*** -1 0.406 0.268 1.052 0.061*** 13.616 12.712 1.683 -0.718*** -3.136 -11.707 -13.755 567       
(0.001) (0.000)
-0.842*** -1 0.397 -0.033 0.658 0.053*** 11.647 10.406 1.446 -0.756*** -3.242 -11.707 -13.755 559       
(0.000) (0.000)
2) No earnings annc days
3) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts days
4) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts or 
mutiple rec days 
Recommendation Change = –4
1) Full sample
2) No earnings annc days
5) Remove 5% from both tails of (4).
6) Remove LTS-identified outliers from (4)
5) Remove 5% from both tails of (4).
6) Remove LTS-identified outliers from (4)
Recommendation Change = –3
1) Full sample
Skew Kurt # Obs
KS normal 
test
3) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts days
4) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts or 
mutiple rec days 
Percentiles Filtered Samples Mean
Mode (50bps 
intervals) 
% CAR +
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Table 2 (Cont’d)  
100% 99% 75% Median 25% 1% 0%
-4.374*** -1 0.315 -0.993 9.265 0.171*** 128.090 23.324 0.782 -2.003*** -6.841 -48.737 -82.120 27,075  
(0.000) (0.000)
-3.642*** -1 0.333 -0.938 11.110 0.185*** 128.090 24.435 0.910 -1.622*** -5.572 -47.753 -82.120 22,475  
(0.000) (0.000)
-2.176*** -1 0.356 -0.394 18.096 0.170*** 128.090 25.371 1.111 -1.282*** -4.352 -38.346 -82.120 20,368  
(0.000) (0.000)
-1.706*** -1 0.357 0.470 28.308 0.145*** 128.090 19.672 1.052 -1.190*** -3.921 -27.228 -82.120 17,676  
(0.000) (0.000)
-1.554*** -1 0.341 -0.496 0.280 0.055*** 6.746 5.956 0.787 -1.190*** -3.527 -11.347 -12.557 15,910  
(0.000) (0.000)
-1.301*** -1 0.358 -0.140 0.562 0.048*** 10.736 8.926 0.974 -1.095*** -3.442 -11.523 -12.817 16,377  
(0.000) (0.000)
-3.786*** -1 0.335 -1.149 10.108 0.159*** 156.225 19.616 1.015 -1.775*** -6.267 -43.349 -86.701 57,290  
(0.000) (0.000)
-3.246*** -1 0.349 -1.269 11.816 0.170*** 156.225 19.455 1.109 -1.481*** -5.318 -42.379 -86.701 47,724  
(0.000) (0.000)
-2.030*** -1 0.371 -0.767 19.422 0.150*** 156.225 19.792 1.296 -1.168*** -4.301 -33.288 -86.701 43,643  
(0.000) (0.000)
-1.623*** -1 0.375 -0.151 25.088 0.127*** 156.225 17.059 1.286 -1.074*** -3.933 -25.626 -86.701 38,515  
(0.000) (0.000)
-1.420*** -1 0.361 -0.410 0.129 0.048*** 7.099 6.350 0.987 -1.074*** -3.560 -11.239 -12.384 34,665  
(0.000) (0.000)
-1.194*** -1 0.378 -0.127 0.513 0.045*** 11.570 9.356 1.217 -0.977*** -3.534 -12.119 -13.384 36,058  
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.076** 0 0.494 0.360 37.133 0.127*** 196.327 18.864 2.299 -0.041** -2.300 -21.156 -76.972 42,805  
(0.044) (0.023)
-0.075** 0 0.492 0.543 46.935 0.123*** 196.327 17.401 2.170 -0.065*** -2.197 -18.744 -70.902 38,038  
(0.041) (0.001)
0.074** 0 0.495 1.451 57.905 0.114*** 196.327 17.094 2.165 -0.034* -2.120 -15.643 -70.902 37,015  
(0.035) (0.055)
0.112*** 0 0.495 2.156 70.290 0.111*** 196.327 16.426 2.138 -0.034* -2.083 -14.362 -69.226 33,861  
(0.001) (0.053)
0.033 0 0.494 0.108 -0.143 0.021*** 7.633 6.955 1.847 -0.034** -1.821 -6.455 -7.048 30,475  
(0.122) (0.041)
-0.016 0 0.491 0.040 0.457 0.034*** 10.048 8.706 1.937 -0.062*** -1.970 -8.636 -10.145 32,062  
(0.521) (0.001)
Skew Kurt Percentiles # Obs
4) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts or 
mutiple rec days 
6) Remove LTS-identified outliers from (4)
5) Remove 5% from both tails of (4).
Filtered Samples
3) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts days
1) Full sample
2) No earnings annc days
3) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts days
Mean
Recommendation Change = –2
1) Full sample
2) No earnings annc days
KS normal 
test
% CAR +
Mode (50bps 
intervals) 
6) Remove LTS-identified outliers from (4)
Recommendation Change = –1
4) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts or 
mutiple rec days 
5) Remove 5% from both tails of (4).
6) Remove LTS-identified outliers from (4)
Recommendation Change = 0
5) Remove 5% from both tails of (4).
1) Full sample
2) No earnings annc days
3) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts days
4) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts or 
mutiple rec days 
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100% 99% 75% Median 25% 1% 0%
2.687*** 0.5 0.652 2.203 23.696 0.127*** 154.432 30.831 5.275 1.530*** -1.095 -16.019 -71.010 47,006  
(0.000) (0.000)
2.211*** 0.5 0.638 2.511 31.949 0.130*** 154.432 27.576 4.540 1.273*** -1.160 -15.013 -71.010 38,708  
(0.000) (0.000)
2.216*** 0.5 0.638 2.877 36.071 0.131*** 154.432 27.220 4.441 1.254*** -1.129 -13.266 -71.010 37,460  
(0.000) (0.000)
2.049*** 0.5 0.636 2.436 27.115 0.123*** 148.831 24.569 4.236 1.201*** -1.121 -12.357 -54.099 33,963  
(0.000) (0.000)
1.689*** 0.5 0.651 0.571 0.114 0.059*** 12.705 11.702 3.811 1.201*** -0.858 -5.397 -5.981 30,567  
(0.000) (0.000)
1.368*** 0.5 0.627 0.198 0.460 0.048*** 13.472 12.263 3.744 1.056*** -1.148 -9.157 -11.637 32,070  
(0.000) (0.000)
2.783*** 0.5 0.668 2.839 36.939 0.131*** 171.386 30.421 5.198 1.694*** -0.889 -15.435 -69.245 20,397  
(0.000) (0.000)
2.330*** 0 0.653 2.982 40.107 0.136*** 154.432 27.869 4.520 1.405*** -0.959 -14.474 -69.245 16,740  
(0.000) (0.000)
2.320*** 0 0.653 3.330 45.270 0.138*** 154.432 27.126 4.390 1.377*** -0.943 -12.755 -69.245 16,191  
(0.000) (0.000)
2.111*** 0 0.649 3.456 47.704 0.130*** 152.010 23.884 4.133 1.291*** -0.945 -11.440 -49.089 14,682  
(0.000) (0.000)
1.739*** 0 0.666 0.571 0.055 0.053*** 12.050 11.058 3.758 1.291*** -0.701 -4.719 -5.191 13,214  
(0.000) (0.000)
1.445*** 0 0.641 0.228 0.377 0.040*** 12.681 11.636 3.685 1.134*** -0.963 -7.960 -10.684 13,837  
(0.000) (0.000)
1.267*** -1 0.542 1.046 7.426 0.125*** 54.906 27.236 4.252 0.522* -2.530 -22.427 -32.143 518       
(0.001) (0.059)
1.182*** -1 0.536 1.217 8.506 0.131*** 54.906 30.059 3.905 0.353 -2.519 -22.427 -32.143 463       
(0.004) (0.137)
1.341*** -1 0.537 1.396 9.180 0.137*** 54.906 30.059 3.900 0.362 -2.404 -19.794 -32.143 456       
(0.001) (0.122)
1.057*** -1 0.525 0.693 4.033 0.126*** 35.642 24.354 3.396 0.263 -2.425 -18.793 -26.115 415       
(0.003) (0.326)
0.844*** -1 0.528 0.599 0.342 0.085*** 13.035 12.570 3.005 0.263 -2.222 -7.967 -8.885 375       
(0.000) (0.302)
0.583** -1 0.515 0.303 0.500 0.078*** 13.555 12.998 2.963 0.097 -2.357 -11.648 -12.969 388       
(0.021) (0.577)
Recommendation Change = +3
# Obs
KS normal 
test
Mode (50bps 
intervals) 
% CAR + Skew
4) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts or 
mutiple rec days 
5) Remove 5% from both tails of (4).
6) Remove LTS-identified outliers from (4)
1) Full sample
2) No earnings annc days
3) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts days
6) Remove LTS-identified outliers from (4)
5) Remove 5% from both tails of (4).
6) Remove LTS-identified outliers from (4)
Recommendation Change = +2
2) No earnings annc days
3) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts days
4) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts or 
mutiple rec days 
5) Remove 5% from both tails of (4).
1) Full sample
1) Full sample
2) No earnings annc days
3) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts days
4) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts or 
mutiple rec days 
Recommendation Change = +1
Filtered Samples Mean Kurt Percentiles
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100% 99% 75% Median 25% 1% 0%
1.919*** -1 0.613 1.080 9.072 0.124*** 46.785 26.140 4.651 1.113*** -1.319 -14.121 -30.655 333       
(0.000) (0.000)
1.649*** 1 0.606 1.254 12.579 0.130*** 46.785 26.140 4.204 1.082*** -1.302 -13.232 -30.655 287       
(0.000) (0.000)
1.906*** 1 0.612 2.340 13.865 0.125*** 46.785 26.140 4.341 1.084*** -1.260 -11.439 -12.303 276       
(0.000) (0.000)
1.678*** -1 0.602 2.764 19.026 0.128*** 46.785 17.965 3.574 0.996*** -1.247 -10.383 -12.303 241       
(0.000) (0.002)
1.354*** -1 0.613 0.555 -0.310 0.090*** 9.997 8.878 3.062 0.996*** -1.101 -4.248 -4.625 217       
(0.000) (0.001)
1.119*** -1 0.593 0.233 0.137 0.068** 10.451 9.380 3.049 0.932*** -1.247 -7.516 -9.700 226       
(0.000) (0.006)
Recommendation Change = +4
Filtered Samples Kurt Percentiles # Obs
KS normal 
test
Mean
Mode (50bps 
intervals) 
% CAR + Skew
5) Remove 5% from both tails of (4).
6) Remove LTS-identified outliers from (4)
1) Full sample
2) No earnings annc days
3) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts days
4) No earnings annc or mgt forecasts or 
mutiple rec days 
Table 2 (Cont’d)  
  
Table 3 
Removing influential tail to make recommendation event CAR insignificant 
This table reports the average recommendation (rec) change event CAR (in percent) when x% of the 
influential tail of sample 4 of Table 2 is removed. Sample 4 is the rec change sample where we remove recs 
falling in the three-day window associated with earnings announcements and management forecasts, and 
firm-days with recs from multiple analysts. When the average CAR becomes insignificant, subsequent rows 
below are intentional left blank. The sample of rec changes are from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File. Each rec 
change is an analyst’s current rating minus his prior rating. Recs with no prior ratings (i.e., initiations) are 
excluded. Ratings are coded as 1 (sell) to strong buy (5), and rating changes lie between -4 and 4. The mean 
three-day event buy-and-hold CAR are reported with *, **, and *** indicating statistical significance 
(based on standard errors clustered by calendar day) at the 10%, 5%, or 1% levels respectively. CAR is 
daily buy-and-hold raw return less the buy-and-hold return on a size-B/M-momentum matched portfolio.  
 
-4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4
0% -1.747*** -0.577 -1.706*** -1.623*** 2.049*** 2.111*** 1.057*** 1.678***
1% -1.261*** -1.332*** -1.275*** 1.700*** 1.760*** 0.766** 1.383***
2% -0.796** -1.111*** -1.063*** 1.498*** 1.568*** 0.553* 1.251***
3% -0.447 -0.936*** -0.894*** 1.332*** 1.413*** 0.360 1.094***
4% -0.786*** -0.749*** 1.189*** 1.278*** 0.998***
5% -0.655*** -0.619*** 1.061*** 1.157*** 0.865***
6% -0.535*** -0.501*** 0.943*** 1.047*** 0.787***
7% -0.425*** -0.392*** 0.833*** 0.945*** 0.716***
8% -0.322*** -0.290*** 0.730*** 0.850*** 0.611***
9% -0.224*** -0.194*** 0.632*** 0.759*** 0.545**
10% -0.131*** -0.102*** 0.539*** 0.673*** 0.450**
11% 0.451*** 0.590*** 0.389*
12% 0.365*** 0.511*** 0.331
13% 0.283*** 0.435***
14% 0.204*** 0.361***
15% 0.126*** 0.289***
16% 0.051* 0.219***
17% -0.022 0.151***
18% 0.084**
19% 0.018
Beginning #obs 377 629 17676 38515 33963 14682 415 241
x% of influential 
tail removed
Mean event CAR of recommendation change category
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Table 4 
Comparing analyst and firm characteristics of influential versus non-influential 
recommendation changes 
Influential recommendations (recs) are compared with non-influential recs. There are two definitions of influential. 
First, influential recs are those are when a correct-signed CAR is 1.96 standard deviations greater than expected 
based on the firm’s prior three-month idiosyncratic volatility of daily returns. Second, influential recs are defined as 
those whose normalized CARs are more than 1.96 standard deviations better than the mean prior 12-month 
normalized CAR of the similar rating change category. A normalized CAR is simply the CAR scaled by the firm’s 
prior idiosyncratic volatility. The sample is from I/B/E/S with earnings announcement days, management forecast 
days, and multiple-rec days removed (sample 4 in Table 2). Reiterations (rec change=0) are also excluded. Panel A 
reports the average analyst or rec characteristic by subsamples. Forecast accuracy quintile is the quintile rank (lower 
rank=greater accuracy) of the analyst based on his last unrevised FY1 earnings forecast for that fiscal year according 
to Loh and Mian (2006)). A rec moves away from the consensus (dummy variable) when the absolute deviation of 
the new rec from the consensus is larger than the absolute deviation of the prior rec from the consensus (as in 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2006)). Star analysts (dummy variable) are analysts who are ranked as All-Americans in the 
most recent annual Institutional Investor polls. Analyst experience in quarters is the number of quarters since the 
analyst issued his first earnings forecasts or stock rec on I/B/E/S. Concurrent earnings forecast is a dummy 
indicating whether the analyst issued any type of earnings forecast in the three-day window around the rec (as in 
Michaely and Womack (2006)). Panel B compares firm characteristics prior to the rec issue. B/M ratio is measured 
as in Fama and French (2006), size is the prior month CRSP market cap, institutional ownership is the percent of the 
firm owned by 13f institutions reported in the most recent quarter-end. Turnover is based on the last three-month 
average daily percentage of shares traded divided by total shares outstanding. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard 
deviation of the residuals from a time-series regression of past three-months’ daily returns against the Fama-French 
three factors and total volatility is the standard deviation of prior three-month daily returns. Dispersion is the 
standard deviation of the I/B/E/S reported mean FY1 forecast divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast. # 
of forecasts is the number of forecasts (all horizons) issued by all analysts for the firm in the last three months. Panel 
C compares the changes in the firm environment around the rec. Leader-follower ratio is the gap sum of the prior 
two recs divided by the gap sum of the next two recs. Ratios larger than one indicate a leader analyst whose recs are 
quickly followed by other brokers’ rec issuances. We also compute the Δ in volatility of daily returns from the prior 
3 months to the 3 months after the rec (excluding the three-day event window). We also computed in the same 
manner, Δ idiosyncratic volatility of daily returns, and Δ average daily turnover.  Δ Dispersion is the change one 
month before to one month after the rec, where dispersion is the standard deviation of the I/B/E/S reported mean 
FY1 forecast divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast. The reported values for total, idiosyncratic 
volatility, dispersion, and turnover are multiplied by 100 (e.g. 1.0 represents 1.0%). Δ in # of EPS forecasts is the # 
of EPS (all horizons) forecasts issued by all analysts for the firm three months after the rec minus three months 
before. Δ |Forecast Revision| is computed for the FY1 and FY2 and long-term growth (LTG) consensus analyst 
forecast revisions from three months before to three months after the rec. FY1 and FY2 consensus forecasts 
revisions are scaled by price and LTG forecasts are in percent. Asterisks in the difference columns indicate 
statistical significance using standard errors clustered by calendar day where *,**, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
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Influ – Not t-stat Influ – Not t-stat
Number of recommendations 98,575 10,972 106,026 3,521
10.0% 3.2%
Forecast accuracy quntile (1= most accurate) 2.801 2.770 -0.032** (-2.13) 2.800 2.755 -0.045* (-1.80)
Away from consensus 0.525 0.579 0.054*** (9.48) 0.528 0.603 0.075*** (8.33)
Star analyst 0.184 0.214 0.030*** (4.93) 0.186 0.226 0.040*** (4.59)
# Qtrs analyst in I/B/E/S 28.593 29.107 0.514** (2.10) 28.658 28.238 -0.420 (-1.13)
Relative firm-specific experience in qtrs 0.337 0.548 0.211** (2.45) 0.361 0.291 -0.069 (-0.55)
Concurrent earnings forecast 0.453 0.540 0.087*** (12.27) 0.459 0.564 0.105*** (10.61)
B/M ratio 0.490 0.498 0.008 (1.31) 0.491 0.503 0.012 (1.40)
Size ($m) 8757.98 6743.43 -2014.6*** (-7.77) 8683.78 4714.72 -3969.1*** (-11.21)
Institutional ownership 0.599 0.616 0.017*** (5.37) 0.601 0.584 -0.016*** (-3.75)
Dispersion ×100 14.205 15.211 1.006 (1.06) 14.281 15.061 0.780 (0.55)
Idiosyncratic volatility ×100 2.647 2.387 -0.260*** (-10.66) 2.627 2.451 -0.176*** (-5.72)
Total volatility ×100 2.916 2.642 -0.274*** (-9.79) 2.895 2.682 -0.213*** (-6.25)
Daily turnover 0.642 0.591 -0.050*** (-7.27) 0.640 0.536 -0.105*** (-11.06)
# of EPS forecasts 80.221 64.813 -15.408*** (-17.52) 79.575 51.649 -27.926*** (-26.66)
Leader-follower ratio of rec  2.032 3.143 1.111*** (11.63) 2.079 4.074 1.995*** (9.36)
Δ Volatility of daily ret ×100 (-3mth,+3mth) -0.119 0.333 0.452*** (23.37) -0.093 0.520 0.614*** (21.62)
Δ Idiosyncratic volatility ×100 (-3mth,+3mth) -0.111 0.340 0.451*** (26.71) -0.086 0.527 0.613*** (23.04)
Δ Dispersion ×100 (- 1mth,+1mth) 1.074 0.637 -0.437 (-0.41) 0.958 3.192 2.234 (0.96)
Δ Daily turnover ×100 (-3mth,+3mth) -0.006 0.085 0.092*** (23.55) -0.002 0.130 0.131*** (19.43)
Δ in # of EPS forecasts  (-3mth,+3mth) -1.036 4.828 5.864*** (10.38) -0.649 5.589 6.238*** (8.51)
Δ in FY1 |Forecast Revision|×100 (-3mth,+3mth) 0.141 0.926 0.785* (1.65) 0.192 1.069 0.877 (0.85)
Δ in FY2 |Forecast Revision|×100(-3mth,+3mth) 0.075 1.088 1.012*** (2.58) 0.131 1.559 1.428* (1.82)
Δ in LTG |Forecast Revision|×100 (-3mth,+3mth) -0.010 0.004 0.014 (0.58) -0.010 0.038 0.048 (1.33)
Panel C: Change in firm environment around recommendation
Panel A: Analyst and recommendation characteristics
Panel B: Firm characteristics prior to recommendation
Characteristics 
Influential based on firm's idio-volatility Based on distribution of past rec CARs
Not Influ  Influential Difference Not Influ  Influential Difference
 
 
  
Table 5 
Analysts who had at least one influential recommendation change 
Analysts who had at least 5 recommendations (recs) in the 1994-2006 period are compared according to whether 
their recs have ever been influential. There are two definitions of influential. First, influential recs are those are 
when a correct-signed CAR is 1.96 standard deviations greater than expected based on the firm’s prior three-month 
idiosyncratic volatility of daily returns. Second, influential recs are defined as those whose normalized CARs are 
more than 1.96 standard deviations better than the mean prior 12-month normalized CAR of the similar rating 
change category. A normalized CAR is simply the CAR scaled by the firm’s prior idiosyncratic volatility. The 
sample is from I/B/E/S with earnings announcement days, management forecast days, and multiple-recommendation 
days removed (sample 4 in Table 2). Reiterations (rec change=0) are also excluded. Panel A reports the average 
analyst or recommendation characteristic by analysts who were ever influential versus those who were never 
influential. The percentage of analyst recs that are influential is the average proportion of an individual analyst’s 
recs that are influential conditional on the analyst ever being influential in the whole sample. Forecast accuracy 
quintile is the quintile rank of the analyst based on his last unrevised FY1 earnings forecast for that fiscal year 
according to Loh and Mian (2006)). A recommendation moves away from the consensus (dummy variable) when 
the absolute deviation of the new recommendation from the consensus is larger than the absolute deviation of the 
prior recommendation from the consensus (as in Jegadeesh and Kim (2006)). Star analysts (dummy variable) are 
analysts who are ranked as All-Americans in the most recent annual Institutional Investor polls. Analyst experience 
in quarters is the number of quarters since the analyst issued his first earnings forecasts or stock recommendation on 
I/B/E/S. Concurrent earnings forecast is a dummy indicating whether the analyst issued any type of earnings forecast 
in the three-day window around the recommendation (as in Michaely and Womack (2006)). Asterisks in the 
difference columns indicate statistical significance using standard errors clustered by calendar day where *,**, and 
*** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
Ever–Never t-stat Ever–Never t-stat
Number of Analysts 1,010 3,055 2,320 1,745
75.2% 42.9%
% of analyst's recs that are influential  0.0% 18.9% 0.0% 10.9%
Forecast accuracy quntile 2.913 2.809 -0.103*** (-4.50) 2.856 2.807 -0.049*** (-2.91)
Away from consensus 0.525 0.536 0.011** (2.02) 0.530 0.537 0.008** (1.97)
Was once a Star analyst 0.104 0.240 0.136*** (11.05) 0.151 0.280 0.129*** (9.90)
# Qtrs analyst in I/B/E/S 16.869 23.729 6.860*** (11.86) 19.081 25.939 6.859*** (12.60)
Relative firm-specific experience in qtrs -2.464 -0.781 1.683*** (11.23) -2.062 -0.053 2.009*** (15.46)
Concurrent earnings forecast 0.481 0.471 -0.009 (-1.06) 0.477 0.469 -0.008 (-1.15)
Ever 
Influential 
Difference Characteristics 
Influential based on firm's idio-volatility Based on distribution of past rec CARs
Never
Ever 
Influential 
Difference Never
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Table 6 
Probit predicting when a recommendation change will be influential 
The dependent variable is whether a recommendation (rec) is influential. There are two definitions of influential. 
First, influential recs are those are when a correct-signed CAR is 1.96 standard deviations greater than expected 
based on the firm’s prior three-month idiosyncratic volatility of daily returns. Second, influential recs are defined as 
those whose normalized CARs are more than 1.96 standard deviations better than the mean normalized CAR of the 
similar rating change category for the entire sample period. A normalized CAR is simply the CAR scaled by the 
firm’s prior idiosyncratic volatility. The explanatory variables are as follows. The Rec Level is the rating level after 
the rec change (1=sell to 5=strong buy). The absolute value of the rec change, upgrade dummy, and reg FD dummy 
(=1 after Aug 2000) and Settlement dummy (=1 in 2003 and after) are also included. Past forecast accuracy quintile 
is the average quintile rank of the analyst based on his last unrevised FY1 earnings forecast for all the firms he 
covers in the previous fiscal year. Smaller ranks denote greater accuracy. Away from consensus=1 when the 
absolute deviation of the new rec from the consensus is larger than the absolute deviation of the prior rec from the 
consensus. Star analysts rank is the All-Americans rank in the most recent annual Institutional Investor polls. We 
reverse ranks so that high numbers correspond to superior ranks, i.e., top rank=4, second=3, third=2, runner-up=4. 
Absolute analyst experience based on the # of quarters since the first earnings forecasts or stock rec on I/B/E/S. 
Relative firm-specific experience is based on the analyst’s firm-specific experience less the average experience of 
other analysts covering the stock. Concurrent earnings forecast=1 when the same analyst issued any type of earnings 
forecast in the three-day window around the rec. Leader-follower ratio (LFR) is computed as follows. The gaps 
between the current rec and the previous two recs from other brokers are computed and summed. The same is done 
for the next two recs. The LFR is the gap sum of the prior two recs divided by the gap sum of the next two recs. The 
past ratio is the average of the analyst’s LFRs from the prior 12 months. B/M is the book-to-market ratio and size is 
the end-June market cap, and momentum is the holding period return in the prior 12 calendar months skipping a 
month, and institutional ownership is the percent of the firm owned by 13f institutions reported in the most recent 
quarter-end. Turnover is based on the last three-month average daily percentage of shares traded divided by total 
shares outstanding. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals from a time-series regression of 
past three-months’ daily returns against the Fama-French three factors. Dispersion is the standard deviation of the 
I/B/E/S reported mean FY1 forecast divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast. # of forecasts is the number 
of forecasts (all horizons) issued by all analysts for the firm in the last three months. *,**, and *** represent 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively, using standard errors clustered by analyst, with associated z 
statistics in parentheses.  
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Table 6 (Cont’d) 
Coefficient Marg. Eff Coefficient Marg. Eff
Rec level  -0.029*** -0.005*** -0.024 -0.001
(-2.60) (-2.60) (-1.50) (-1.50)
Absolute value of rec change 0.042*** 0.007*** -0.014 -0.001
(2.70) (2.70) (-0.61) (-0.61)
Upgrade Dummy 0.137*** 0.023*** 0.143*** 0.008***
(6.47) (6.45) (4.52) (4.45)
Reg FD Dummy 0.112*** 0.018*** 0.165*** 0.009***
(4.47) (4.47) (4.66) (4.61)
Settlement Dummy 0.091*** 0.015*** -0.010 -0.000
(3.46) (3.37) (-0.25) (-0.25)
Past forecast accuracy quintile -0.013** -0.002** 0.000 0.000
(-2.19) (-2.19) (0.01) (0.01)
Rec away from consensus 0.130*** 0.021*** 0.138*** 0.007***
(8.64) (8.63) (6.19) (6.16)
Star analyst rank (rank: 0 to 4, 4 =top) 0.055*** 0.009*** 0.043*** 0.002***
(6.74) (6.75) (3.35) (3.33)
# Qtrs analyst in I/B/E/S -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(-0.42) (-0.42) (-1.19) (-1.19)
Analyst's relative experience 0.003** 0.000** 0.003* 0.000*
(2.28) (2.28) (1.84) (1.84)
Concurrent earnings forecast 0.193*** 0.032*** 0.226*** 0.012***
(12.76) (12.72) (9.85) (9.96)
Past Leader-Follower Ratio 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.000***
(3.77) (3.77) (3.18) (3.18)
Log(B/M) -0.092*** -0.015*** -0.106*** -0.006***
(-9.23) (-9.24) (-7.23) (-7.24)
Log(Size) -0.076*** -0.013*** -0.117*** -0.006***
(-9.89) (-9.99) (-10.32) (-10.70)
Price momentum -0.040** -0.007** -0.070*** -0.004***
(-2.51) (-2.51) (-2.61) (-2.61)
Log(Institutional ownership) 0.064*** 0.010*** 0.045 0.002
(2.74) (2.75) (1.32) (1.32)
Log(Turnover) 0.067*** 0.011*** 0.097*** 0.005***
(4.57) (4.58) (4.59) (4.58)
Log(Idiosyncratic volatility) -0.312*** -0.051*** -0.353*** -0.018***
(-13.79) (-13.94) (-10.12) (-10.35)
Dispersion 0.019** 0.003** 0.013 0.001
(2.28) (2.27) (1.41) (1.42)
Log(# of forecasts) -0.135*** -0.022*** -0.180*** -0.009***
(-11.80) (-11.71) (-11.17) (-11.03)
Pseudo R-sq 0.03719 0.05550
# Observations 62572 62572
Chi-Sq test 1138.93*** 686.39***
Explantory Variable
Influential based on distribution 
of past CARs
Influential based on firm's prior 
idio. volatility
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Figure 1 
Transition probabilities of recommendation changes 
The sample of recommendation (rec) changes are from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File 1993 to 2006. Each rec change (or 
rating change) is an analyst’s current rating minus his prior rating. Analyst initiations are excluded. Ratings are 
coded as 1 (sell) to strong buy (5), and rating changes lie between -4 and 4. Firms with less than 3 analysts making 
up the consensus are excluded. The chart plots the transition probabilities of rec changes—the probability that a 
prior rec transits to any of the five rating categories.   
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Figure 2 
CAR of upgrades and downgrades 
The sample of recommendation (rec) changes are from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File 1993 to 2006. Each rec change (or rating change) is an analyst’s current rating 
minus his prior rating. Analyst initiations are excluded. Ratings are coded as 1 (sell) to strong buy (5), and rating changes lie between -4 and 4. Firms with less 
than 3 analysts making up the consensus are excluded. The charts plots the histogram of three-day event CARs of one-point upgrades, two-point upgrades, two-
point downgrades, and one-point downgrades respectively. CAR is the three-day buy-and-hold return around the rec less the corresponding return on a size-B/M-
momentum matched DGTW characteristic portfolio.  
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Figure 2 (Cont’d) 
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Figure 3 
Histogram of proportion of an analyst’s influential recommendation changes  
We plot the histogram of the proportion of an analyst’s recommendation (rec) changes that are influential. We focus on analysts who made at least five recs in the 
1994 to 2006 period. The first definition of influential uses the firm’s past idiosyncratic volatility of daily returns to determine if a rec change is influential (1.96 
standard deviations away). The second uses the history of prior same magnitude rec change CARs to determine if a change is influential (1.96 standard deviations 
away). 
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